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Symposium “Beyond Montesquieu: Re-thinking the architecture of  contem-
porary governance”: The internet needs new types of  legal ordering, which are 
adapted to self-regulation and the rapid transformation of  knowledge and social 
norms. Data protection, public investigation, “social media” and financial mar-
kets challenge the classical orientation of  the legal system towards individual 
behaviour. The new “addressees” of  law are networks as quasi-subjects. New 
regimes of  proceduralisation can structure the development of  a “net-friendly” 
paradigm of  a law beyond the individual. The article tries to demonstrate the 
feasibility of  such a model with reference to the above-mentioned challenges. 
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Resumo
A internet precisa de novos modelos de regulação jurídica, adaptados 
para a auto-regulação da rápida transformação do conhecimento e das nor-
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1. pRelImInARy RemARks
This article looks at the reasons for the lack of  a discussion on ”network oriented“ media and internet 
law. The Internet has fundamentally changed the conditions of  communication.1 It has broken down or 
undermined all borders between formats, individual and mass communication, communication content, and 
technologies of  telecommunication. As a ”network of  networks” (Elie Noam)2, it is also a challenge for the 
legal system which has linked its conceptions and doctrine to those separations and borderlines. 
The internet community tends to react to this evolution by a principled opposition to any legal intervention 
into internet communication which it regards as incompatible with the autonomy of  its users.3 This is, at least 
in some respect, due to the fear that the new ”relational rationality“ of  the net may not only raise the number 
of  choices for the users but also for external control which is simplified by the flexible technology of  the in-
ternet (whereas at the same time this allows for a reaction to escape or curb control strategies). Certainly the 
internet is “completely different,“ but this does not exclude the possibility to develop a “completely different“ 
legal ordering which pays tribute to its flexibility and creativity.4 In the following, with a view to several domains 
of  conflict, both concerning the traditional conflict of  “the man versus the state” and the new constitutional 
dimension of  legal conflict between private persons (and organizations), it shall be tested how far new network 
friendly rules might be conceived which not only do justice to the logic of  the internet, but might reinforce it.
2. pRotectIon fRom offensIve communIcAtIon In the InteRnet (blogs etc.)
2.1. The structure of media law and the transformation of social norms as its infrastructure 
The reciprocal adjustment of  the private and public domains, and, as a consequence, the limits of  the 
distribution of  knowledge (and ignorance/secrecy), in the past, followed a kind of  “separation of  powers” 
inherent in the knowledge basis of  society.5 These “knowledge rules” cannot be reduced to simple and static 
border concepts, but were founded on a complex infrastructure of  a plurality of  legal and social norms, 
which included bridging concepts and meta-rules on the conflict of  norms – both explicit and implicit.6
On the one hand, a media-related law of  libel and slander about the limits of  public communication has evolved 
over a long period of  time. On the other hand, it should not be overlooked that, at the same time, the oral medium 
of  “rumour” allowed for types of  communication that remained beyond the control of  the law – and not just 
under conditions of  tight social control of  communication.7 However, a multiplicity of  stop rules of  discretion, of  
separations between the private and the professional, the private and the political, the spatial limits of  the expansion 
of  “rumours”, the differentiation of  different fora (art and newspapers, for example), as well as rules of  hypocrisy 
(paying lip-service to the recognition of  “honour” in public while, at the same time, secretly spreading unpleasant 
1 See Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of  Networks (Yale UP, 2006); Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody: The Power of  Organizing 
without Organization (Penguin Books 2009); Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of  Cyberspace (Basic Books 2006), who 
describe the new logic of  the internet as not only a new means of  communication.
2 Interconnecting the Network of  Networks (MIT Press 2001).
3 For the ideology of  this movement see the homepage of  the Swedish Pirate Party which even gained access to the European 
Parliament, www.piratpartiet.se/international/english; the German Pirate Party has in the meantime even become more successful.
4 See Tal Z. Zarsky, Law and Online Social Networks: Mapping the Challenges of  User-Generated Information Flows, 18 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media 
and Entertainment Law Journal 741 (2008); Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking Outside the Box: Considering Transparency, Anonymity and Pseudonimity as Overall Solutions 
to the Problems of  Information Privacy in the Internet Society, 58 University of Miami Law Review 1301 (2004).
5 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Privacy, the First Amendment, and the Internet, in: Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum (eds), The Offensive 
Internet.  Speech, Privacy, and Reputation, (Harvard University Press, 2010), 174, at 180.
6 See Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Helmut Ridders Konzeption der Meinungs- und Pressefreiheit in der Demokratie, 32 Kritische Justiz, 281 (1999).
7 Cf. Lior J. Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of  Privacy, 72 University of  Chicago Law Review, 919 (2005).
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or spiteful gossip) and the respect for the protection of  “appearances” as a cultural achievement (as opposed to 
claims of  “essence” and truth) have contributed to the emergence of  a complex architecture of  overlapping rules 
of  co- and sub-ordination, specification of  situations that have transformed the private as much as the public into 
a multi-faceted construction that has been processed by different social institutions.8
All in all, one can start from the assumption that the historical processes of  change are related to the evo-
lution of  a paradox, the production and protection of  the “individual of  society” (Markus Schroer), whose 
form by itself  is related to the different regimes of  individuality and its normativity. As a consequence, the 
construction of  “privacy” and its complex rules and patterns is also based upon the idea of  a reproduction 
of  society and not upon the right of  the individual “to be let alone”.9 The observation and evaluation of  
“private” behaviour in well-defined spaces and integrated communities were both based upon the protec-
tion and the continuation of  social norms.10
The same is true for the construction of  “publicity”, which produces forms of  differentiation and specification 
with respect to the development of  social memory, the processing of  common themes for social communication, 
different fora of  exchange (the media), the private-public spheres of  the formation of  individuals (family, church, 
school, reading of  canonical texts) and the state as the centre of  public decision-making.11
2.2 The great unbundling“ of the media and its impact on social norms
One of  the crucial phenomena of  the transformation of  the media and their public in postmodernity is 
to be seen in a tendency towards “the great unbundling”, a formulation which the American Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) has chosen for the description of  the tendency towards more specialisation 
and the decline of  a focused public of  common interests which had been centred around the state in the 
past.12 This evolution finds its repercussion in an increasing tendency to de-contextualise freedom of  opinion 
and to transform it into a right to unlimited self-expression devoid of  any public requirements or borders: 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) tends to combat any restriction of  freedom of  opinion as being 
prone to the creation of  “chilling effects” in the individual: in cases of  “cyber-mobbing”, for example, the 
ACLU tends to act as amicus curiae with the clear intent to protect any communication, even the most degrad-
ing depiction of  teachers in the internet (teachers being shown as decapitated on electronically manipulated 
photos or other images), whereas the protection of  competing interests is regarded as the competency of  
“pedagogical measures”.13 This is characteristic of  the new evolution towards a blurring of  the limits and 
distinctions that had been the object of  the above-mentioned architecture of  norms on the inter-relationship 
between the public and the private in the past, and is now regarded as a “right to be let alone” or to communi-
cate with “friends” without being bothered by any unintended third-party effect.14 Whereas, in modernity, the 
“chilling effect” was invoked as a risk to the public function of  freedom of  opinion, the blurring of  borders 
between the private and the public is characteristic of  the hybridity of  the new media.15
8 See generally Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Das Medienrecht und die Ökonomie der Aufmerksamkeit (von Halem: 2007).
9 Privacy has paradoxically always had different social dimensions, Levmore & Nussbaum, Introduction, in: idem (eds), supra note 5, 1, at 10.
10 Strahilevitz, supra note 7; Diane L. Zimmermann, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 
Cornell Law Review, 291, at 332-334 (1983).
11 Cf. for the state-centred conception of  publicity Federal Constitutional Court, Reports (BVerfGE) Vol. 7, 198 at 208; vol. 5, 
85 at 205.
12 Federal Communications Commission (FCC), “The Changing Media Landscape in a Broadband Age”, (June 2011), available 
at: www.fcc.gov/infoneedsreport.
13 Cf. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Rechtsfragen des „Cyberbullying“ an Schulen und der Lehrerbewertungsportale in den USA, Frankreich und 
Deutschland, 7 Recht und Bildung, 3 (2010/1).
14 Cf. the timely theoretical reconstruction of  the role of  freedom of  opinion in a liberal society and the rationale of  its limits 
John Deigh, “Foul Language: Some Ruminations on Cohen v. California”, in: Levmore & Nussbaum, supra note 5, 195, at 210-212.
15 Anyone who has doubts about the necessity to impose limits on offensive internet speech should read the impressive article by 
Brian Leiter, Cleaning Cyber-Cesspools: Google and Free Speech, in: Levmore & Nussbaum, supra note 5, 155, at 168, which combines case 
analysis and insightful theoretical reflection.
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This shift demonstrates the legitimacy of  a retrospective on the normative and social rules that have deter-
mined the acceptability and attunement or evolution of  themes in the “old media” (including oral gossip) in 
explicit legal and implicit social forms: one of  the aspects of  this normative definition of  limits or relevance 
could be seen in the preservation of  social trust in the professional standards of  journalism that should be 
developed by the media as a kind of  “epistemic rules”, and which served as a frame of  reference in the pro-
cess of  the definition of  the legal borders of  public and private communication. The obligation to control 
the truth of  a factual claim communicated through the media, the separation of  comment and message, 
reflection on the difference between the private and the public, etc., are the foundations of  a process of  the 
self-stabilisation of  a set of  professional rules by which the media have to abide and whose generalisation 
allows for the development of  a reliable legal standard of  control. The professionalisation of  journalism and 
the centralisation of  the “epistemic rules” that courts have to draw upon allows for a stable practice of  dif-
ferentiation between knowledge and ignorance, the distribution of  communications and secrecy.
Apparently, this complex architecture of  norms is severed by the anarchic and heterarchic character of  In-
ternet communication.16 Do we need new “net friendly” institutions for the protection of  the personality rights 
or the secrecy and ignorance that could conflict with general assumptions about the “freedom of  internet”?17
It could be imaginable to respond to the hybrid character of  the new media and the tendency to blur 
the separation of  the public and the private by a legal model that corresponds to this hybridity and which 
would start from the idea, first of  all, of  observing the societal basis for the self-organisation of  the new 
rules for communication in conditions of  complexity, and to use the legal system, court practice in particu-
lar, as a reflexive layer of  normative re-coding in the mode of  a “regulatory agency”. In the next paragraph, 
a further example for a new regulatory function of  private law and private law courts will be given. The 
dynamic transformation of  both social and legal norms has an impact on the function of  courts, as private 
actors tend to transform the stable foundations of  a spontaneously-evolving common experience. This can 
be demonstrated with a view to transnational private law in general, and the ICANN-rules in particular.18 
As a consequence, one could think, as a first step, of  imposing a new responsibility for the management of  
the rules of  Internet communication on the providers. This could be done by a combination of  “the carrot 
and the stick”: limits imposed on the liability of  providers for third-party communication could be made 
dependent on the establishment of  private institutions of  an alternative dispute-resolution procedure that 
would allow for a preliminary settlement of  a conflict about conflicts between freedom of  opinion and the 
protection of  personality rights. A kind of  private, albeit neutral, “Cyber Court” could act as an arbitrating 
body19 which establishes a cheap and simple mode of  decision-making upon the basis of  a few flexible pro-
cedural rules (only by electronic communication).20 One could even think about enabling participation by an 
“avatar” or the email address. All users of  Internet services could be obliged to accept such arbitration pro-
visionally, although this should not exclude the possibility of  bringing these cases to ordinary state courts. 
All privileges of  restricted liability, etc., could be formulated under the condition that the provider has to 
establish a functioning mode of  arbitration. State courts would, in this case, act as a kind of  second instance 
courts with the function of  controlling the private self-regulation21  as it is managed by the “cyber courts”. 
16 See, for the “imbalance” between privacy and freedom of  opinion, Daniel J. Solove, Speech, Privacy, and Reputation on the Internet, 
in: Levmore & Nussbaum, supra note 5, 15, at 27.
17 See for the US the discussion on anonymous advertising in the ( for example apartments for: “whites only”), Rachel M. Kurth, 
Striking a Balance Between Protecting Civil Rights and Freedom of  Opinion, 26 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, 805 at 832 (2008).
18 For the evolution of  a transnational law beyond the state in general, see Oren Perez, Normative Creativity and Global Legal Plural-
ism: Reflections on the Democratic Critique of  Transnational Law, 10 Indiana Journal of  Global Legal Studies (2003) available at: http://
www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol10/iss2/2.
19 See for the US Olivera Medanica & Kaiser Wahab, Social Media, Recent Developments and Legal Considerations, 26 Cardozo Art 
& Entertainment Law Journal, 237, 266 et seq. (2008), who propose a “notice and take down“-rule for libel incombination with a 
requirement to take the case to court within 10 days. In addition to this they favour the creation of  an insurance fund for the com-
pensation of  harm inflicted on persons via the internet.
20 See, for a similar approach, Leiter, supra note 15, at 170, for search engines like Google.
21 Cf. only Gralf-Peter Calliess & Peer Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code – A Theory of  Transnational Private 
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Both levels of  “private law regulation”22 could be expected to observe and evaluate primarily patterns of  
communication, to block problematical forms of  communication or to strengthen productive models, new 
procedures, and, in the long run, the emergence of  new rules that would correspond to the old architecture 
of  social and legal norms on social communication and the relationship between knowledge and ignorance. 
Those providers who failed to act in conformity with these requirements would be treated as if  they fol-
lowed only private interests (and would not support a public system of  communication).
3. dAtA pRotectIon In the InteRnet – foR A chAnge fRom buReAucRAtIc pRotectIon to 
net fRIendly pRoceduRAlIzAtIon
3.1 From the protection of individual “ownership“ of data toward the observation of data flows and nodes
The problems of  data protection in the internet are so manifold that not all can be raised in the context of  
this article. This is also the reason why they cannot be tackled by clear-cut rules to be imposed on the net in 
advance, from outside. The steering of  data-communication is impossible. This complexity can, however, be 
tackled by a version of  proceduralization of  the legal order of  the self-organization process which the inter-
net undergoes as the “network of  networks”. The internal differentiation of  the legal structure of  the inter-
net may allow for the generation of  new knowledge and its processing via specific institutions of  the internet.
A net-specific problématique of  the implementation of  legal controls consists in the discrepancy be-
tween the attention which the single data of  the individual meets on the one hand, and the values of  the 
processing and relationing of  data through data mining, the construction of  personality profiles23, the ob-
servation of  broad data flows, and the operation of  linking data by firms  and by the state for reasons of  
security. The interest in closure and disclosure of  information are both legitimate. 
3.2 The necessity to observe the collective effects of the processing of data flows 
It would be much more helpful to change the paradigm of  the conception of  data protection 2.0 to a focus 
on networks, i.e. to have a closer look at the opportunities and risks of  data processing in networks and to adapt 
its legal structure which is still characterized by its origin in the offline world to the conditions of  the media 
world.24 The rapid proliferation and continuous linking of  information in networks can no longer be adequately 
mirrored in the individual right to decide on separate domains of  action which are attributed to persons. This 
construction can no longer do justice to the hybridization of  legal constellations. For example: a firm can pos-
sibly generate a high information value by data-mining,25 which does not correspond to the construction of  an 
accumulation of  infringement of  individual rights to decide on the use of  the data which are of  no particular 
interest to the user himself. A hybrid construction which is more adapted to the collective transsubjective com-
ponent of  the data in a network can bring a more flexible and adequate solution to this dilemma (see below). 
A case for a reconceptualization of  data protection is the deanonymization of  IP-addresses by both private 
persons and the public security agencies. In this respect it should be taken into consideration that the internet 
Law (Hart Publishing 2010, at 134-152.
22 For a theory of  regulation, see Julia Black, Proceduralising Regulation, Parts I and II, (2000-2001) 20-21 Oxford Journal of  Legal 
Studies, 597 (2000) & , 33 (2001).
23 See Joseph Turow & Lokman Tsui, The Hyperlinked Society: Questioning Connections in the Digital Age (University of  
Michigan UP, 2008); Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Datenverarbeitung und Datenschutz bei neuartigen Programmführern in ‘Virtuellen Videotheken’, 3 
Multimedia und Recht 715 (2000).
24 For a first attempt to give an overview of  the problems of  privacy in the „social media“ see James Grimmelmann, Facebook and 
the Social Dynamics of  Privacy, 94 Iowa Law Review 1137 (2009).
25 Bing Liu, Web Data-Mining: Exploring Hyperlinks, Contents and Data Usage (Springer, 2007).
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as the “network of  networks” cannot be dissolved into a number of  linear relationships of  exchange between 
individuals - the precondition of  the older regime of  protection of  protection of  privacy in telecommunica-
tions - but that the old telecommunication has been transformed into an online world with its own rationality 
of  information processing und generation of  new information products which is based on the generation of  
collective and collateral effects between information. These transsubjective effects can no longer be attributed 
to individual ”owners.“ Examples of  these new phenomena are eBay ratings26 and ratings of  professional 
achievements (teachers, professors, medical doctors etc.).27 The ubiquitous nature of  the internet and its new 
logic comes also to the fore when we take a look at the transformation of  the relationship between different 
types of  rights which have been developed and coordinated in the offline world and migrate into the internet. 
It is inevitable that this entails a major effect of  destabilization which has to be compensated by a rebalancing. 
3.3 The self-organization of the “data-owners“vis-à-vis private actors following the example 
of”„collecting societies“ in the protection of intellectual property: A model for a net friendly 
legal instruments
A new “control regime“28 which is fine tuned to the functioning of  the internet and the processing of  
data and patterns of  combination could, for example, consist in the public and private funding of  self-or-
ganized private institutions for the protection of  data in the internet following the model of  collecting 
societies in intellectual property law and practice.29 Such a new type of  association of  users might act as 
“information broker” in the sense of  a representation of  the hybrid public-private interests of  the users 
which transcend their own limited privacy concerns and are focused on the transsubjective elements of  data 
processing in the Internet. These associations could make contracts on the conditions of  the use of  data 
that are not of  much concern for each individual. This approach could correspond to the new transbor-
der effect, which is common for the internet use of  data inasmuch as it raises collective effects from mass 
transactions which hitherto did not have any relation except to a central agent (such as a broadcaster). This 
“information broker” might make contracts on payment for the use of  internet data or make contracts on 
the quality of  protection of  privacy. This form might be a productive alternative to the bureaucratic form of  
data protection by the institution of  a public officer for the protection of  privacy (Datenschutzbeauftragter).30 
This model could present the appropriate levels of  flexibility and hybridization (balancing individual and 
collective interests) which are required by the logic of  the internet, whereas traditional legal instruments and 
procedure are more based on the expectation of  stability of  rights and public goods. 
A new control regime has to adapt to the volatility and ubiquity of  internet communication by flexible 
self-organization of  legal positions which are involved in a procedural mode of  permanent self-transformation. 
It has to react to the fact that even identities are no longer stable but are ”sampled“ and open to transformation. 
One can even go so far as to assume that networks themselves become quasi-subjects in their own right.
26 In the US eBay offers an electronic mediation procedure via ”Square Trade;“ http://pages.ebay.com/services/buyandsell/
disputeres.html
27 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Die Zulässigkeit von Lehrerbewertungen im Internet, 56 Recht der Jugend und des Bildungswesens 16 (2008); the 
Federal Court of  Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) has regarded ratings of  teachers as legal, see Dec. of   June 23, 2009, VI ZR 196/08, 64 
Juristenzeitung 961 (2009) with a comment by Karl-Heinz Ladeur; for cyber-mobbing in schools in the US see Rita J. Verga, Policing 
their Space: The First Amendment Parameters of  School Discipline of  Student Cyberspeech, 23 Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law 
Journal 727 (2007); with respect to the differentiation of  different types of  public spaces in the internet era see Jonathan Zittrain, 
The Future of  the Internet - and How to Stop it 213 (Yale UP, 2008), where classrooms e.g. are regarded as “private public spaces” 
which should not be turned into “public public spaces”; otherwise there would be a pressure to be always on “press conference 
behavior”.
28 Harrison C. White, Identity and Control: How Social Formations Emerge 345  (2nd ed., Princeton UP, 2008).
29 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Datenschutz – vom Abwehrrecht zur planerischen Optimierung von Wissensnetzwerken, 24 Datenschutz und Datensi-
cherheit 12 (2000); for a critique to ”economization“ of  data following the  model of  intellectual property rights, see Thilo Weichert, 
Die Ökonomisierung des Rechts auf  informationelle Selbstbestimmung, 54 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift1463 (2001).
30 Obviously there are limits to the individual decision on data but this process of  self-organization might also help determine 
these limits.
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4. cRImInAl lAW And cRImInAl pRoceduRe In the fAce of “RIsky netWoRks“
4.1 From organized criminality toward “criminal networks“ – the example of Al Khaida
On February 27th, 2008, the German Federal Constitutional Court31 pronounced a new fundamental 
decision on online investigation for the purpose of  criminal prevention. It has pronounced a new “comput-
er freedom“32 in the sense of  the protection of  confidentiality and integrity in electronic systems as a new 
version of  the protection of  privacy. One may doubt that this general construction fits the emerging logic 
of  networks because the internet is not just a means communication but of  production of  informational 
goods and bads as well. From the point of  view of  the public authorities a balance has to be struck between 
the protection of  informational actors and networks on one hand, and on the protection from the perverse 
effects of  the confidentiality33 of  the internet in particular. The internet is not a more sophisticated version 
of  the telephone, which is a means of  individual exchange. It is a whole new “online world”, a “network 
of  networks”, including a whole range of  different formats and regimes which cannot be paralleled with 
anything we have known in the past. For example: the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) 
has already in the past reduced the level of  protection for conventional telecommunication which abuses 
the anonymity of  electronic contacts for criminal purposes or for anonymous harassment. 34 This looks 
obvious: why should a person deserve the procedural aspects of  the protection of  telecommunications for 
direct criminal purposes? (This is not to be confounded with the control of  the content of  communication.) 
In the internet one has to be aware of  the fact that networking as such can be an efficient form of  pre-
paring and committing criminal acts which would not be imaginable in traditional telecommunication. So, 
why should all parts of  the network of  networks deserve the same level of  protection? This cannot be a 
consequence of  the new computer freedom. 
The court formulates a number of  requirements for online investigation35 for purposes of  public securi-
ty in particular, i e. the concrete threat of  a danger to be expected for an important public good on the basis 
of  concrete facts which in general have to be checked by a judge. One has to bear in mind that a new type 
of  criminality is emerging, what I would call ”network criminality.“ In the field of  terrorism, no longer pri-
marily concrete acts are to be feared which can be attributed to persons. At the same time “risky networks” 
come to the fore which can no longer be regarded as mere preparatory communications that from a legal 
point of  view are irrelevant below a concrete step of  implementation of  a criminal plan. The inherent risks 
of  such criminal networks have to be reduced to a certain extent in a strategic mode, their ”costs“ have to be 
raised once a clear-cut prevention of  any criminal action would appear to be an illusion. Terroristic activities 
of  Al Khaida36 and like networks are processed in postmodern fractal “cellular businesses“ in which dif-
ferent ideological, military, informational, financial, communicative, etc., operations are aggregated in a het-
erarchical “virtual organization.“ Criminal law had to adapt to the emergence of  organized criminality (e.g. 
by the adapting doctrine to collaborative action), and the same will be inevitable for “criminal networks.“ 
The forms of  criminality follow the transformation of  the legal evolution of  cooperation; in the network 
society37 we have networked criminality. 
31 Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG), 61 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 822 (2008).
32 See the comment by Martin Eifert, Informationelle Selbstbestimmung im Internet, 28 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 521 
(2008).
33 See for the English conception of  privacy as a regime of  “confidentiality“ Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other 
Path: Recovering the Law of  Confidentiality, 96 Georgetown Law Journal 123 (2007).
34 BVerfGE 85, 386; see generally A. Michael Froomkin, Legal Issues in Anonymity and Pseudonymity, 15 The Information Society 
113 (1999).
35 BVerfG, 61 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 822 (2008).
36 See RAND Document ”Beyond Al-Qeida,“ 2 Vols., 2006.
37 Manuel Castells, The Rise of  the Network Society, Vol. 1: Economy, Society and Culture (2nd ed., Willey-Blackwell, 2000).
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As in franchising networks38, we find central integrative nodes (for the ideology). Apart from this ele-
ment we have ”strings“ which are set up for the collection of  data, the financial transactions which on the 
face appear to be harmless and do not allow for the identification of  “concrete facts“ which can be read as 
the starting point of  a criminal act. The functioning of  the “risky networks“ could not be observed at all if  
any investigation could only be focused on concrete ”facts“ that indicate imminent danger. Liberal institu-
tions are adapted to handle danger which can be attributed to persons. They have difficulties in addressing 
the risk related to criminal organizations, but they have yet to meet the challenge of  risky networks. 
There is a deep imbalance between the rights of  users and third parties – private and public – in the 
online world: In the offline world the state, in particular, has a lot of  formal and informal instruments of  
observation and investigation in criminal procedure. Traces can be analyzed, testimonials can be collected, 
experts can be asked, etc. In the internet, ”traces“ are always digitized; they can only be analyzed if  this 
possibility is introduced into the architecture of  the net. If  one were to leave this disruption aside, data pro-
tection would end up as systematic protection of  criminal wrongdoers. In the offline world, protection of  
privacy, the secrecy of  telecommunication, and the presumption of  innocence in particular abuse, and the 
possibility of  ”false negatives“ in criminal investigation is accepted because otherwise unintended perverse 
effects might have a repercussion on freedom in general and generate a chilling effect on communication e. 
g. by telephone.39 If, however, the collection of  proofs meets a systematic difficulty linked to the whole tech-
nological structure of  the online world, this could change the balance between the rights and public goods 
which are at stake in this constellation. It would generate the certainty that one could not be prosecuted for 
criminal acts committed under the protection of  anonymity in the online world. 
The ”chilling effect“ would in this case be created on the side of  the potential victims of  criminal acts 
and the state as defender of  individual rights. This is why anonymity cannot be given such far reaching 
protection against criminal investigation. On the other hand, one has to admit that the reverse reaction – 
the unlimited expansion of  public privileges for investigation in criminal procedure - would create a new 
imbalance because it would ease the investigation even below the threshold of  risks which can be attributed 
to concrete action. However, one has also to consider that the flexible internet communication simplifies 
the preparation of  serious criminality by the protection of  anonymity. And in addition to this one has to 
bear in mind that the limited intrusion into the preparation of  criminal acts is not without preconditions: it 
is based on the assumption that – in political criminality in particular – the plans to commit, for example, 
a terroristic act may be hampered by the influence of  the public fora (discussions with others, radio, TV, 
press etc.).40 On the other hand, the internet brings to the fore a whole range of  new networks which are 
completely closed off  from any irritating influence from other groups, ideas, etc. The internet is a network of  
networks, but this does not mean that all the networks are interrelated; on the contrary. This means, that the 
fragmentation of  the “internet fora” which replace traditional conceptions of  a publicity that is managed 
by the classical media risks to sever the public debate as a means of  rationalization of  politics, reflection of  
individual motives or reciprocal observation and evaluation of  behaviour.
4.2 Criminal procedural investigation
There is a lot of  discussion about data-protection by technology – so why not think about a technology 
that would not protect privacy in a fundamental way but would impose limits on the use of  procedural mea-
sures ofpublic investigation? Individuals move actively through the internet with the use of  a pseudonym as 
a kind of  avatar. The same could be imagined in the reverse role when they are partially identified as “nodes” 
38 Gunther Teubner, Networks as Connected Contracts 21, 235 (Hart Publishing, 2011).
39 For communication in general see Frans Birrer, Data Mining to Combat Terrorism and the Roots of  Privacy Concerns, 7 Ethics and 
Information Technology 211 (2005).
40 See the overview in Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech: The Ambiguous Legacy of  Civil Libertarianism 144 (Univer-
sity of  California Press, 1991).
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in a risky network: in order to limit public collection of  data one can choose an objective limit and reduce 
investigation by formulating a high level of  intervention (“concrete facts“).41 One could also think about a 
subjective mode of  limiting the linkage of  the data found in the internet to the real name of  a suspicious 
person in the offline world. To a certain extent only this avatar of  a person may be constructed and used 
as a frame of  reference for the collection of  data. Only a second level of  investigation would allow under 
certain conditions to make a link between the online and offline worlds, i. e. the real person and its avatar.42 
The technical basis of  such a differentiation could again be seen in the possibility of  calculating a hash 
value which freezes the data and the potential IP-address or other ways of  access to the real world in a nu-
merical code and deposits the key to the offline world at a separate institution which might be organized as 
a kind of  cyber court within the agency. The technique of  erecting firewalls within the net which separate 
different informational regimes could be transferred to public investigation procedures. Control regimes 
could be differentiated according to the potential of  the internet and its relational rationality. 
A major part of  the public concerns about the increasing data collection in public agencies could be mit-
igated with such a net friendly strategy. At the same time such a formalized operation with firewalls within 
state bureaucracy might allow for better control than an unstructured mass of  data which is collected and 
processed according to different patterns and rules. The strategy of  public officers of  data protection to de-
clare any data to be sensitive in advance is not adapted to the strategic mode of  operation in networks. Data 
protection and its control regimes in the internet have to be conceived in a net-related mode. They should 
focus on nodes of  relationships in networks and not (primarily) on persons. (Obviously there are types of  
data which are sensitive from the outset, e.g. data on health, but this is not the rule.) 
5. contRActs on the use of socIAl medIA As „netWoRks of contRActs“?
5.1 Social media and data protection
The use of  “social media” such as Facebook has raised several legal questions, of  data protection, in particular. This 
problem will exacerbate in the future because – as has been shown by Facebook’s entry on the securities market – the 
high value of  a firm such as Facebook is, to a large extent, a valuation of  hope. The actual profit drawn from person-
alised advertising does not yet justify the actual value of  the firm.43 This is why conflicts concerning data protection 
are gaining more relevance. The firms have to develop more novel forms of  advertising, an evolution which, in turn, 
raises more concerns about the protection of  privacy because “social media” promise more fine-tuned addressing of  
advertising, and this includes more observation of  user- habits and interests. Both the data protection officers of  the 
German Länder and a recent court judgment from the Berlin District Court (Landgericht)44 have raised concerns about 
Facebook’s practices of  both the collection and the use of  personal data for advertising purposes. In the context of  a 
constitutional perspective on the conflicts concerning new electronic media in general, the question should be asked 
as to whether or not new trans-subjective institutional solutions could be formulated in order to attempt to bear in 
mind the deep transformation that is taking place in the new media. Both the firms themselves and the protagonists 
of  a more rigid conception of  data protection tend to focus on the role of  the consent of  the individual consent (the 
will of  both the users and the providers) or the individual interest (mainly) of  the users. 
41 BVerfG, 61 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 822 (2008).
42 See Kim A. Taipale, “Data-Mining and Domestic Security. Connecting the Dots to Make Sense of  Data”, 5 Columbia Science 
and Technology Law Journal 1 (2003); id., Technology Security and Privacy: The Fear of  Frankenstein, the Mythology of  Privacy, and the Lessons 
of  King Ludd, 7 Yale Journal of  Law and Technology 128 at 159 et seq. (2004).
43 http://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2012/05/10/can-facebook-tap-11-billion-mobile-ad-market-to-justify-pe-of-206/
44 LG Berlin, judgement of  March 6th, 58 Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis (WRP) 623 (2012); cf. Christian Solmecke/Annika 
Dam, Wirksamkeit der Nutzungsbedingungen sozialer Netzwerke, 15 Multimedia und Recht (MMR) 71 at 732 (2012) (Facebook).
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This is all the more problematical as the right to privacy is in itself  a right that lacks transparent contours 
like a classical liberal right,445 and seems to be dependent on the individual self-interpretation of  the users. 
Recent empirical analyses tend to come to the conclusion that there is a wide range of  attitudes towards the 
protection of  private data with regard to the diffusion of  news among “friends”. At the same time, there 
have been protests on the part of  the users against one-sided changes of  privacy rules set up by Facebook, for 
example. The inherent dynamic of  transformation of  social media leads to a complexity of  the rules and 
patterns of  communication46, and to their re-coding for commercial purposes, which is not easily accessible 
to individual users. One could think about a more “trans-subjective” approach to privacy in social media that 
would include a more institutionalised conception. 
This could look plausible because the right to privacy as a new right beyond the realm of  classical liber-
ties could be attributed to the new “risk based law” – as opposed to the classical right of  being protected 
from “danger” - as is the precautionary principle in environmental law whose individual component is 
also only mediated. In data protection law, this seems to be similar.47 This is why there is a need for more 
trans-subjective institutions that are better adapted to the process, such as distributed interest in the control 
of  the “re-coding” and “re-profiling” of  data. This assumption is not equivalent to a fundamental break 
with classical doctrine, but it should open a perspective on the development of  a “conception”, which 
would allow for experimentation with the instruments which the current legal system contains, and would 
opt for public intervention only in a limited way – because of  the uncertainties of  the markets.
5.2 The „network contract“ as a new paradigm of private law for the „social media“
First of  all, it should be recognised that, besides other legal arguments for the liability of  social-media 
providers, primarily the relationship between users and social media is a contractual one. In the American 
literature, this type of  contract is regarded as an “adhesion contract”.48
In legal practice, this means that the contract has the legal value of  a more or less one-sided submission 
to the contract because conditions are normally formulated by only one partner of  the contract, i.e., the 
“provider”. The construction of  a contractual relationship seems to be adequate because one partner, the 
provider, offers the possibility of  using the communication services, whereas the other, the user, gives his 
consent to the use of  the data that he places on his account for advertising strategies. This mutual consent 
brings about a relationship of  reciprocity: the user can expect the conditions of  use not to be changed arbi-
trarily. The provider lays open the conditions of  use and the commercial use of  the data for advertising, in 
particular. An exclusion of  any forms of  advertising is not a choice which is open to the users. 
The specific contractual relationship that is brought about in this constellation is characterised by the fact 
that a high number of  similar “exchange” contracts are concluded at the same time, and that conditions of  use 
are formulated by the provider. However, at the same time, there is a second level of  inter-relationships among 
the users themselves, which is not just a multiplication of  a standardised version of  a contract, although, in this 
45 This is why Helen Nissenbaum’s conception of  “Privacy as Contextual Integrity”,  79 Washington Law Review, 119, at 136-8 
(2004), does not look promising because contexts are so varied; see, also, the critique by James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook  94 
Iowa Law Review, 1137, at 1169 (2009); whereas in the public-private relationship the idea of  “relational surveillance” that might 
have a “chilling effect” on the use of  the freedom of  association (and freedom of  opinion) as Katherine Strandburg, Freedom of  As-
sociation in a Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of  Relational Surveillance, 49 Boston College Law Review, 741 (2008), the effect 
of  private collection of  data on the rights of  users is far from obvious (which does not mean that it is non-existent).
46 Arun Mal & Jenisha Parikh, Facebook and the Right to Privacy: Walking a Tight Rope, 4 National University of  Juridical Studies Law 
Review (NUJS LR), 299 at 305 (2011); Helen Anderson, A Privacy Wake-Up Call for Social Networking Sites?, 20 Entertainment Law 
Review, 245 (2009), refers to a practice of  users to allow for the use of  „their“ data by inadvertently neglecting their privacy settings.
47 Cf. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Das Recht auf  informationelle Selbstbestimmung – eine juristische Fehlkonstruktion?, 62 Die Öffentliche Verwal-
tung 45 at 48 (2009).
48 Cf. the seminal article by Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of  Adhesion – Some Thoughts About Freedom of  Contract, Yale Fac-
ulty Scholarship Series Paper 2731, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/2731. 
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case, the relationships between the participants including the user – user-relationships - form a “triangular” 
contract. The consent of  the user to make use of  the data for advertising only makes sense in the event that the 
other users allow for this use, too. This constellation might allude to the recent construction of  “network con-
tracts”49 – with a principled construction of  this new type of  contract, although Stefan Grundmann is more 
prudent in this regard.50 The sense of  such a construction could consist in the consequence that the triangular 
nature of  the contract does not remain at the factual level but can lead to ideas about a specific “hybrid” insti-
tutional component. The relationship is a “hybrid” one in as much as it can be located beyond the level of  the 
bilateral exchange contract, but below the level of  a “company” (or, even less so, a corporate association). One 
has to bear in mind that this is not a normal case of  a pre-determined setting of  “general terms and condi-
tions” that supplement the consent of  the partners on the reciprocal rights and obligations, but of  a one-sided 
competency of  the provider to define the main duties of  the user and to change them whenever he deems it 
appropriate.51 The differentiation of  the informational scheme of  Facebook’s sites mirrors, in a way, the “hybrid” 
character of  the “regulatory” structure of  the network: Facebook has, apart from the site on which the general 
terms and conditions are laid out,52 a separate site on “governance”,53 which contains rules of  procedure on the 
change of  rules, etc. This construction might look promising, although, as a consequence, only those members 
that click on this site54 obtain the information on the procedures.55
The trans-subjective (“hybrid”) component of  the contract is to be seen in the fact that the purpose of  
the contract is not to be formulated clearly in advance. The relationships within the network are prone to 
continuous change, they evolve upon the basis of  communication processes, which, first of  all, are freely 
formulated and are integrated into a vast open network of  relationships that allow for a plethora of  commu-
nicative options. It is only at a secondary step that the provider observes these inter-relationships and tries 
to design the possibility of  “surfing” on this network with the modelling of  a commercial type of  interest.
Advertising in the “social media” does not follow the traditional patterns of  addressing a mass public; 
instead, it is characterised by the observation and “appropriation” of  specific communicative networks that 
are spontaneously generated by the users. These differentiated networks process personalised information 
on consumer interests that may be re-coded by advertising firms. This is also the reason why the consent of  
the users for the re-processing of  personalised profiles cannot be determined in detail ex ante. 
This new constellation might fit into the new framework of  “networks of  contract” which might help 
develop new rules for the management of  a hybrid “network interest” (G. Teubner) between exchange and 
collective interests. This “network interest” is emergent and heterarchical; at the end of  the day, it can only 
be adopted for purposes of  advertising if  this is consented to by the users. The provider cannot just follow 
his own interest, but also has to support the processing of  the networks of  communications between the 
users by shaping an adequate institutional framework.56 The relevance of  the network of  the inter-relation-
ships between the users and the openness of  the experimental development of  communicative patterns and, 
at the same time, the evolving possibilities of  personalised advertising could be a sound basis for the re-for-
mulation and concretisation of  the pre-conditions of  “informed consent” in a dynamic environment.57
49 Teubner, supra note 40.
50 Stefan Grundmann, Die Dogmatik der Vertragsnetze, 207 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis, 718, at 757 (2007).
51 For a critique, see Robert J. Ferenzi, Friending Privacy: Toward Self-regulation of  Second Generation Social Networks, 20 Fordham Intel-
lectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 1049, 1056 (2010).
52 www.facebook.com/legal/terms.
53 www.facebook.com/fbsitegovernance.
54 Recently, Facebook has announced a change in the “terms of  use” on the governance site and opened a voting procedure for 
the week of  1 June to 8 June 2012; however, only a tiny fraction of  the users that remained far below the quota has participated; cf. 
“Die Mitbestimmung ist rein virtuell”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of  6 June 2012.
55 See Ferenzi, supra, note 51, at 308.
56 This complex new network related interests might also give an explanation for the fact that apparently the interests of  the 
individual users concerning their “own” data seem to be limited, as Grimmelmann, supra note 45, at 1182, rightly assumes; see, also, 
idem, Privacy as Product Safety, 19 Widener Law Journal, 795 at 795-97 (2010).
57 Rebecca MacKinnon, Consent of  the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle for Internet Freedom 243 (Basic Books, 2012) and passim; 
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5.3 Proceduralisation of „informed consent“
In order to do justice to the emergent character of  the rules58 and patterns of  communication and their 
re-coding by advertising strategies, one might think about introducing a procedural format that has been 
used in regulation in conditions of  complexity, i.e., the “notice and comment”59 procedure which the new 
rules given by the provider should be required to undergo.
This is a new institutional requirement of  norm-setting in public procedures. However, it could also be 
transferred to private processes that have to observe and aggregate the knowledge that is distributed over a 
high number of  users and considers both the normative expectations and the social norms generated over 
the networks of  communication in a process of  private norm-making. This procedure seems to be specifi-
cally adequate in conditions of  a modelling in conditions of  complexity. One should think about a transfer 
of  this format at least to contracts on the use of  social media. As a procedural element of  rule-making, it 
has not been confined to regulation in domains of  public law: in globalised private rule-making60 , it is quite 
common to make use of  “notice and comment” as a requirement of  the adequate balancing of  interests.61 
The process of  communication within the networks of  social media is also a source of  new social norms62 
concerning privacy expectations, the limits of  intimacy and secrecy, of  fashions and habits, etc.,63 which are 
re-coded by new forms of  personalised advertising, and which might become the object of  supplementary 
“web obligations”.
The formation of  norms through a spontaneous emergence of  patterns of  communication and their 
stabilisation through social expectations and norms and their use in advertising strategies all play an import-
ant role in social media. This could be regarded as a “network effect” that might be attributed legal value. 
A legal “network interest” could be formulated in as much as the provider could be come the addressee of  
a procedural obligation to formulate “net friendly” norms that are open towards the experimentation with 
new forms and norms of  communication and to ascertain a level of  reflexivity  within the “network of  
contracts”.
Through the architecture of  the user formats and the „terms and conditions of  use” that are formulated 
by him, the provider creates the institutional basis whose relevance extends far beyond the narrow limits 
of  an exchange contract. As in the classical media (press, broadcasting, etc.) a public interest concerning 
the dynamic of  the social media is also emphasised by Grimmelmann, supra note 45, at 1195; the District Court of  Berlin (Landgericht) has 
taken the view that several of  the clauses contained in the “Declaration of  Rights and Obligation” (German Version) are not in conformity 
with the German law on the use of  clauses on “terms and conditions” in contracts and cannot be regarded as being included in the contract.
58 This transsubjective relevance of  rules that are generated in the networks of  communication is a focus in Strahilevitz, supra 
note 7, at 925-7 (2005); the networks as such have to be integrated into the legal system not just the protection of  individuals in 
multifaceted “contexts”.
59 Cf. Ferenzi, supra note 51, at 1100; the specific problems of  accessing “terms and conditions“ in the internet to regard 
“click through” bettings or a “browse wrap agreement” as being appropriate as procedure of  information and as a consequence a 
“clicked” consent also being “informed” shall only be mentioned, cf. Ferenzi, supra note 51, at 1072-75 & 1078; see, also, Fteja v. 
Facebook, Inc., No 11 Civ. 918 (RJH), 2012 (WL 183896) SDNY, 24 January 2012; for a new informational approach to privacy also 
Joseph M. Reagle jr., P3P and Privacy on the Web FAQ, http//:www.w3p.org/P3P/P3FAQ.html.
60 Cf. only the contributions in Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods (eds.), The Politics of  Global Regulation (Princeton UP, (2012).
61 The integration of  changed “terms and conditions” into a contract via internet communication (“browse wrap agreement”) 
pre-supposes already according to court practice in Canada “reasonable notice” (Kanitz v. Rogers Cable Inc., (2002), 58 O.R. (3d) 299 
(Ont. Sup. Ct.); this implies an obligation imposed on the user to check from time to time whether changes have been posted, and 
not an explicit “I agree” communication; the postion of  US courts is quite similar: Register.com, Inc. v. Venlo, Inc. 356 F. 3d. 393; 2004 
US App. LEXIS 1074 69; USP. Q.2D (BNA) 1545.
62 Interestingly Facebook Inc. itself  observes and refers to the emergence of  “social norms” in social media according to which 
the users do no longer value privacy in the traditional sense, as Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook’s founder declared, www.guardian.co.uk/
technology/2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy.
63 This includes the use of  biometric data (“autotagging” for “Facial recognition”), a practice that has been criticised by the Irish 
Data Protection Officer in the “Report of  Audit” on Facebook Ireland Ltd., 21 December 2012, in spite of  the fact that this issue 
is not specifically addressed in Irish data-protection law, available at:  http://dataprotection.ie/documents/facebook%20report/
final%20report/report.pdf.
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the functioning of  societal communication versus the stateis at stake. At the same time, it is increasingly 
recognised that - as a kind of  reverse side of  the protection of  communication - an institutional self-lim-
itation against a potential self-endangerment of  its function appears to be necessary. This seems to be all 
the more so because it is the user-generated content,64 and not just the use of  pre-determined information, 
that makes the difference65: this situation creates a lock-in effect because the user cannot easily transfer his 
content to a different network. The specific “web interest” that goes beyond exchange interests demands a 
type of  self-regulation by the provider – this type of  self-regulation of  a whole group of  firms can be found in 
the laws on the protection of  minors in public, for example, in Germany. However, there is no reason why 
regulation of  self-regulation should not be extended to single (powerful) firms. In the past, “self-regulation” 
was primarily regarded as an alternative to public regulation.
In the meantime, however, a kind of  “regulatory private law” – to name only consumer protection law66 
– has also emerged, which, in contrast to competition law and its focus an the preservation of  markets, 
aims at a direct steering of  behaviour with a view to the creation of  more variety of  choices beyond the 
traditional narrow control of  contracts. A new private-law based construction of  the emerging figure of  a 
“network contract” on the use of  “social media” could be a new case for the conception of  private regula-
tion if  one also takes into consideration the impact of  a public interest in new hybrid versions of  “private 
public” communication. 67
The “notice and comment” procedure could be such an element of  regulation in the forms of  private law. 
At the same time, one could go a step further and impose a duty on providers to support the the mediation of  
interest between the firm and the users. These mediators could help the users to participate in the “notice and 
comment” procedure in a meaningful way.68 It has to be borne in mind that the fragmentation of  the forms 
of  use, the novelty of  the emerging personalised strategies of  advertising and the complexities of  the “net-
work contracts” including the difficulties in understanding the consequences of  the position of  individuals 
in the overlapping networks of  inter-relationships are a good reason to think about the protection of  a new 
type of  “consumer” i.e., a hybrid type of  “netizen”, who plays different roles in the dynamic evolving web. 
A supplementary reason for public intervention could be seen in the fact that, from case to case, the interest 
of  the user might be of  only low relevance, and this might block access to courts for factual reasons, whereas 
the public interest of  allowing conflicts about data protection to be brought to court is considerably higher.
5.4 The impact of constitutional law on private „network contracts“
In many European countries, this idea could be linked to the conception of  the impact of  constitutional 
liberties on private law, on the one hand,69 and the procedural dimension of  the protection of  civil liberties, 
on the other. This latter dimension has, until now, been considered only for public law, i.e., the German Fed-
64 The protection of  user generated content is an element that could also be given more contours if  it was more related to the 
productivity of  the networked communication and would not only be regarded as „property“ of  an individual user: it is content 
that is generated over the network and should not be easily be attributable by „informed consent“ in a formal way to the service 
provider; see, only, Ferenzi, supra note 51, at 1064; see, also Mal & Parikh, supra note 46, at 302, who rightly refer to the fact that the 
fact that more often than not “content” is distributed over various Facebook sites.
65 In Germany, the District Court of  Berlin (Landgericht) in a judgment of  6 March 2012 - judgment No. 16 O 551/10 – published 
in: 58 Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis, 613 (2012) has declared the broad reservation of  competencies to make use of  user gener-
ated content in particular has been regarded as being incompatible with data protection law and with the requirement to restrict the 
breadth of  transferred intellectual property rights.
66 Eva Kocher, Funktionen der Rechtsprechung. Konfliktlösung im deutschen und englischen Verbraucherrecht 477 (Mohr, 2007).
67 Zittrain, supra note 27, at 213.
68 For the necessity of  transparency of  terms of  use, see the above-mentioned Irish report, supra note 63, at 4.
69 The article by Aurelia Colombo-Ciacchi, The Constitutionalization of  European Contract Law: Judicial Convergence and Social Justice, 2 
European Review of  Contract Law, 167 (2006), demonstrates upon the basis of  research in ten European countries that the “hori-
zontal effect” of  civil rights is widely recognised by courts in Europe; see, also, ead., Giovanni Commandé & Gert Brüggemeier 
(eds), Fundamental Rights and Private Law in the European Union, 2 vols., (Cambridge University Press (2010).
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eral Constitutional Court has, on several occasions, derived a protective,70 and, in particular, a procedural, 
component even from substantive civil liberties; at the same time, it has emphasised the constitutional rele-
vance of  duties to be heard not only in procedures that aim at a restriction to be imposed on a civil liberty, 
but also in the case of  a right to be protected from harm that is expected from industrial installations (nuclear 
power plants, in particular).71 Against this background, only a further step would be needed to combine both 
the doctrine of  the expansion of  civil liberties to private law and the procedural dimension of  civil liberties, 
and to regard this as a basis for the development of  new procedural requirements for the construction of  a 
new network contract on the use and design of  “social media”. In collective labour law, procedural elements 
of  the protection of  privacy have already been developed.72 Clearly, one has to bear in mind that Facebook 
is not only a network, but that it is also a transnational network which raises the problem of  determining 
the applicable domestic law.73 This, however, is a complex question that needs differentiation with respect 
to public and private law, and will not be tackled here. In a context of  international or transnational con-
stitutional law, one could at least consider the possibility of  constructing a transnational effect of  domestic 
constitutions in the sense that a domestic constitution should not just simply be “applied” to transnational 
networks, but its trans-border expansion should take into account that other domestic constitutions are 
also at issue.74 This could be a case of  heterarchical approach to the constitutionalisation of  transnational 
private law that accepts some leeway for the self-regulation of  private actors, and fine-tunes constitutional 
requirements in a co-operative manner that always considers whether constitutional “irritations”75 imposed 
on private legal relationships would be acceptable for other countries and their legal system, as well.
5.5 The creation of “information brokers“ and cyber courts“ as components of a new institu-
tional architecture of internet governance
Finally, one could go one step further and improve the position of  the users and the procedure of  
consenting to the use of  their data in advertising by transforming the rights of  the users to their data to 
a quasi- property-like intellectual property,76 which could lead to more clarity about the object of  the “in-
formed consent” (including a right to financial compensation) and could justify the ability to bring claims to 
court tocollecting societies as is common in intellectual property law. This task could be transferred to the 
above-mentioned “information brokers”, which need not have a monopoly. They could even develop com-
peting strategies and contribute to a pluralistic conception of  the reflection of  social media. Such a solution 
would strengthen the position of  the users in the process of  formulating and transforming the conditions 
of  use in the social media. At the same time, it would contribute to a strategy of  establishing transparency 
in the networks of  contracts and their evolution. In addition to the “proceduralisation” of  data protection 
law outlined in this paper, the development of  a more network-friendly “alternative dispute resolution” 
70 Cf. the overview in Dieter Grimm, The Protective Function of  the State, in: Georg Nolte (ed), European and US Constitutionalism 
137, at 154-155 (Cambridge University Press, 2005); Frank Michelman, The Protective Function of  the State in the United States and Europe, 
in: ibid., 156 et seq.
71 Reports of  the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfGE vol. 53, 30, 65 – Nuclear Power Plant Mülheim-Kärlich).
72 Cf. for the role of  workers representatives in collective labour law Reports of  the Federal Labour Court (BAGE) vol. 127, 276.
73 This is due to the fact that the relationship between “Facebook Ireland“ and the American organisation is contested: The Irish 
Data Protection Commissioner apparently takes (with good reasons) the view that Facebook Ireland Ltd. is the legally autonomous 
European branch of  Facebook and is subject to the control by Irish authorities in the EU; German authorities like the Data Com-
missioner of  the state of  Hamburg regard the American Facebook Ltd. as the relevant legal actor, and as a consequence assume a 
competency for supervision of  German authorities, der Hamburgische Beauftragte für Datenschutz und Informationsfreiheit, 
Datenschutz. Tätigkeitsbericht 2010/2011, 2012, p.158-160.
74 Cf. Karl-Heinz Ladeur & Lars Viellechner, Die transnationale Expansion staatlicher Grundrechte, 46 Archiv des Völkerrechts, 42 (2008).
75 For the use of  this conception that attributes also emergent heterarchical proliferating effects to the law as opposed to a hier-
archical construction of  a superiority of  norms and application or of  a ranking of  norms, see Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants. Good 
Faith in British Law or How Unifying the Law Ends Up in New Differences, 61 Modern Law Review, 11 (1998).
76 This construction is not equivalent to protection of  data as object of  „ownership“ right away – a construction that is criticised 
by Grimmelmann, supra note 45, at 1192.
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mechanism (that has been modelled for the protection of  personality rights in the previous section) should 
be required also in this domain, which would allow for a simplified (electronic) procedure and decision by 
a private “cyber court”, instead of  a decision by a state court.77 The advantage of  such a procedure would 
not only consist in easing access to the protection of  rights, but also primarily in the acknowledgement that 
postmodern society needs a new institutional infrastructure that is focused on the observation and reflec-
tion of  rapidly changing social norms, instead of  stable legal norms. 78
The re-construction of  the contractual constellation of  the operations that are processed in the social 
media was meant to venture an idea on how a network-friendly development of  private law and the insti-
tutionalisation of  a specific legal regime for the “online world” might be conceived. Unfortunately, many 
protagonists regard Internet anarchy as the only version of  freedom of  communication and look wryly 
at any attempt to establish institutions for free communication. The development of  the “social media” 
demonstrates the ambivalence of  such an aversion against legal institutionalisation of  the Internet commu-
nication. The case that has been discussed here shows that this anarchy might also have detrimental effects 
on the position of  the users of  the said social media.
6. outlook
We need “traffic rules“ for the internet and the information society, not the protection of  a nomadic in-
dividualism which fights against any restriction of  its autonomy. A network friendly internet law could make 
use of  the technological flexibility of  a digital relational rationality. Data protection is not the core element 
of  civil liberties as its protagonists sometimes try to make the public believe. The risks of  the new technol-
ogies and the potential perverse side effects of  its use can only be managed within the domain of  options 
which the digital online world has created. Hybridization and the proliferation of  linkages through networks 
are two of  the characteristics of  the internet. Instruments for the protection of  the variety of  the internet 
and the limitation of  state power in the network of  networks should make use of  these paradigmatic phe-
nomena. The recent discussion about the activities of  the US National Security Agency (NSA) that have 
been disclosed by Edward Snowden have provoked a lively controversy in Europe. The frame of  reference of  
the criticism is still the interference with the civil rights of  the individual of  the liberal society and not the 
collective dimension of  risk in the society of  networks: “Everybody is a suspect!” This is obviously not the 
case. It is quite plausible to regard the internet not just as a new means of  communication of  the individual 
but to talk about a new “online world” that is related to the “offline world” we are familiar with, but creates 
new patterns, new social rules and,yes , new pathologies. As has been shown we need a new conception for a 
law of  the “online world”, which raises eventually, if  one may put it this way, also the problem of  managing 
the conflicts between the two “worlds” and their differing regimes of  the “rule of  law”. We might end up 
in the development of  a new type of  a “conflict of  norms”-approach that coordinates the two rationalities. 
First of  all, it’s time to give the law of  the online world contours of  its own! 
77 This is all the more problematic as according to Facebook’s “terms and conditions” (16.1) only the courts of  Santa Clara 
County (CA) shall be competent in cases of  legal conflicts. It is dubious, whether this is compatible with European E-Commerce 
and consumer protection law and the European Council Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of  Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters (22 Dec. 2000, OJ L 12, 16 Jan. 2001), Article 16 par. 1 (consolidated version: http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2001R0044:20100514:EN:PDF).
78 For online dispute settlement in conflicts about consumer contracts see generally Calliess & Zumbansen, supra note 21, 157.
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